Deadly Persistence

Integrating Armed UAV's and Ground Forces in Kandahar

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16 Oct 2009

Aim

- To provide an overview of the integration of UAVs and ground forces in Kandahar province during 2008

Agenda

- The Operating Environment
- The 2 PPCLI Battle Group
- Integrating UAVs into the Joint Tactical Fight

Bottom Line Up Front

- This brief deals with the employment of UAVs, not necessarily “striking” with PGMs from UAVs
- We operated in a “UAV Laboratory” and the lessons learned are applicable across the spectrum
- The key to the employment of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles is the “man”
- Optimal employment of UAVs demands a nuanced understanding of the environment gained only through interaction with the population on the ground
- UAVs and the potential of UAVs influence the manner in which the enemy fights


“It's not necessarily the strong enemy, it's the very weak institutions of the state... in that weakness, you have Taliban influence able to move in there, and through coercion of the people, assert that influence.”
LTG Eikenberry – 10 May 2006



As of: 13 Feb 09

Security Summary 2008



- 24% Afghans perceive improvement, 19% perceive worsening (Sep 08 poll)
- 70% of kinetic events continue to occur in 10% of the districts
- 33% increase in Kinetic Events
- IED events up 27%....single largest cause of casualties
- ISAF/OEF Deaths: up 35%
- Civilian Deaths: up 40% - 46%*


Kandahar
KAF
KANDAHAR
20 km
KAF

TYPICAL PANJAWYI AND ZHAREY TOPOGRAPHY

PANJAWYI AND ZHAREY – FROM THE GROUND

Operational Context



UNCLASSIFIED

The Kandahar Battlespace



From TFH Briefing Apr 08

BG operated in permissive, semi-permissive, non-permis

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'WE'RE NOT GOING TO WIN THIS WAR'

FABRIZIO BENSCH / REUTERS

Women in burqas walk behind a German army gunner with the International Security Assistance Force in Taloqan, Afghanistan, yesterday. Britain's commander in Afghanistan, Brigadier Mark Carleton-Smith, says the war against the Taliban cannot be won.

The 2 PPCLI Battle Group

Battle Group Organization



The BG Team

- 848 Regular Force Soldiers
- 174 Reserve Force Soldiers

Battle Group Role

- The Battle Group role is to *SHAPE* the battlespace through lethal and non-lethal action in order to set the security conditions that *ENABLE* successful ANSF action, development and governance initiatives within the AO
  - **The BG "buys time" to allow Afghans to take control**

So What? – Protect the Population, Enable other Organizations

Battle Group Role – Layman's Terms

- Fight in a manner <u>that will allow the war to be won</u>
  - BG role extends far beyond neutralizing insurgents
    - Influence Afghans
      - Convince [illegible]ROA
        - » Protect/Isolate from the insurgency and its effects
      - Retain support of those who already support GIROA
        - » Protect from the insurgency and its effects
      - Mentor and facilitate the mentorship of all elements of the GIROA
      - Convince insurgents supporters to support GIROA
        - » Hunt and [illegible] need to be killed

NO

BETTER FRIEND

NO

WORST ENEMY

Battle Group Role – Succeeding versus Winning

- **We must focus on the word *succeed* instead of *win* in this campaign**
  - **Success is tied to the will of the Afghan people**

Succeed **– "to make good, thrive prosper, or progress in order to accomplish a favourable aim or outcome"**

Win **– "to acquire, be victorious or triumph as a result of a fight"**

Effects Created by the BG



The Carrot and Stick Approach



COIN as an Argument

A Fight – Talk Proposition

TALK
TALK

FIGHT

How the BG Operated

PRIMARY ACTIVITIES

PHYSICAL OUTPUT

EFFECTS OUTPUT (messages to TA)

- **FRAMEWORK OPS**

We are here to protect you (the population) with ANSF on behalf of the GIROA.

- ***Responsive, visible, combined force***

- **TARGETING**

We see what goes on in the battlespace and will kill those who fight against the GIROA.

- ***Precision collection – Understand the Environment – Find the enemy***

- **DELIBERATE OPS**

We (the ANSF and ISAF) are stronger than the insurgency and will ultimately prevail.

- ***Combined Deliberate Ops – Fix and Finish***

ACCENTUATE POSITIVES

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

MITIGATE NEGATIVES

The Kandahar Battlespace – A Vicious Cycle


2
CF presence attracts insurgents who carry out attacks against CF.
How do we break the cycle?
presence in certain area.
3
Population avoids contact with CF but remain susceptible to insurgent influence.
4
Population moves from area to avoid the coercion from the insurgents and conflict between CF and insurgents. CF increase force protection increase distance from

Focusing Effort – The Stability Box Concept

3

DISRUPTION AREA
Remainder of AOR. Focus of BG and SOF activity. Aim to disrupt insurgents and degrade their ability to influence in other areas of the Stab Box.



2

HOLD AREA
OMLT main effort. Mission is to protect Stab Box from direct insurgent influence. No development occurs in this area. Focused IO efforts on elders and leaders to gain consent. Criteria for development needs to be established to be eligible for PRT benefits. Once criteria met, BUILD AREA expands into this area.



1

BUILD AREA
Selected where there is support for CF and this support will have disproportionate influence in surrounding area. PRT main effort. Permanently presence. **Must** protect population 24/7. No kinetic

KEY

DISRUPT

HOLD

BUILD

The key to
success…

UAVs in COIN

One Man's Vision

"We have just won a war with a lot of heroes flying around in planes. The next war may be fought by airplanes with no men in them at all. It certainly will be fought with planes so far superior to those we have now that there will be no basis for comparison. Take everything you've learned about aviation in war, throw it out of the window, and let's go to work on tomorrow's aviation. It will be different from anything the world has ever seen."

Gen Hap Arnold, USAAF

VJ Day, 1945

Airpower in COIN

"Air power contains the seeds of our own destruction if we do not use it responsibly, we can lose this fight."

General Stan McChrystal
COMISAF
16 June 2009

Another Man's Vision

"We pray to Allah we have American soldiers to kill… but added these bombs from the sky we cannot fight"

Taliban Fighter

Spectrum of UAV Employment



- IPB
- Target acquisition
- Reconnaissance

- CAS
  - FMV Support
  - Air Strike Coordination
  - Direct fire support
  - Dynamic targeting (hunter-killer)

If all you have is a hammer,
everything looks like a nail

CH

Keys to Successful Integration

- **Developing and Maintaining key relationships**
  - Intelligence cells communicating
  - Pilots speaking to pilots
  - Debriefing is the norm
- **Understanding the capabilities of the UAV**
- **Controlling the asset at the appropriate headquarters**
  - Controlled at the HQ that can shorten the kill chain the most
    - Common operating picture
    - Unity of command
- **Ensuring JTACs and an S2 representative were on duty in the BG TOC**
  - Tracking and striking targets requires patience – the UAV is only as persistent as those operating it

The Power to Decide
The Certainty to Act

TACP

ISR O

S2 Ops

S3

Battle Capt

Recommendation to Commander – Strike/No Strike

Keys to Successful Integration

- **Synchronizing ground and air manoeuvre**
  - Battlefield organization – tactical “deep fight”
  - Ground manoeuvre creates a reaction from the insurgents
  - Armed UAVs unnerve the enemy and force them to make mistakes
- **Establishing procedural controls that shortened engagement times**
- **Establishing common sight picture on the application of ROE**
- **Accepting the Positive Identification (PID) of the enemy reflects the enemy’s adaptive nature and evolves**

Keys to Successful Integration

- **Employing an effective targeting methodology**
  - Determines the most important “things we do everyday”
    - Counterinsurgency Triage
      - Those who cannot be influenced
      - Those who support us
      - Those who can be influenced
    - Answers the question: “Where can we have the greatest impact”?
      - What are intended effects?
        - »How do we achieve those effects?
    - Does not replace detailed operational planning

Keys to Successful Integration

- **Employing an effective targeting methodology**
  - Focus on MVTs (people) as the centre of mass
  - Method – complete a series of targeting cycles
    - F3EAD
      - Find – cross-cueing of all sensors
      - Fix – the “unblinking eye”
      - Finish – strike
      - Exploit – face to face cross-talk
      - Analyze – face to face cross-talk – shared analysis
      - Disseminate – info sharing and process refinement

Targeting Framework



The Team

A long road…

Doing the Right Thing… Amidst Chaos

Questions
ISAF

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